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Exploring AsyncRAT and Infostealer Plugin Delivery Through Phishing Emails

BY eSentire Threat Response Unit (TRU)

August 29, 2024 | 4 MINS READ

Attacks/Breaches

Threat Intelligence

Threat Response Unit

TRU Positive/Bulletin

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In TRU Positives, eSentire’s Threat Response Unit (TRU) provides a summary of a recent threat investigation. We outline how we responded to the confirmed threat and what recommendations we have going forward.

Here’s the latest from our TRU Team…

What did we find?

In August 2024, eSentire’s Threat Response Unit (TRU) observed an infection involving AsyncRAT stemming from the execution of a Windows Script File delivered via email. Although we could not retrieve the original email, we assess with high confidence that the malicious archive containing the payload was attached to it.

The payload is a .wsf file which uses a naming scheme that begins with “SummaryForm_” (MD5: 154cc0f462c85b494a45b7531f3a9f03). The file contains HTML character entities, as shown in Figure 1.

HTML character entities found in the malicious wsf file Exploring AsyncRAT and Infostealer Plugin Delivery Through Phishing Emails
Figure 1: HTML character entities found in the malicious wsf file

The .wsf file fetches the VBScript (Figure 2) masquerading as a text file at hxxp://104.243.37[.]35:222/bfbupdeuiterborm/uzopuzbkrpcziwca.txt (MD5: a332817fd302e05b131c7a7a0cdb1a04).

Cleaned-up .WSF file Exploring AsyncRAT and Infostealer Plugin Delivery Through Phishing Emails
Figure 2: Cleaned-up .WSF file

The VBScript does the following:

The VBS script IRUAHCKDFAFDCHUV.vbs (MD5: 1eefdb23f7c63922756eafb532127b8e) is responsible for executing the batch file CEIULUDEZFCEVSMM.bat (MD5: ac0f2aa2c5caf791f0310c2c07a1e1c3). The VBS script is also responsible for executing a PowerShell script at “C:\Users\Public\YXRPNPSMGCOBEURV.ps1” in a hidden window and bypassing execution policies.

Content CEIULUDEZFCEVSMM.bat Exploring AsyncRAT and Infostealer Plugin Delivery Through Phishing Emails
Figure 3: Content CEIULUDEZFCEVSMM.bat

The PowerShell script YXRPNPSMGCOBEURV.ps1 (MD5: 315bc30cd580b750b4afc294fa38a8bc) creates a scheduled task named “MicrosoftEdgeUpdate500” on a Windows system using the Task Scheduler COM API. This task is created to run a VBS script located at C:\Users\Public\WCQCMXNSFCHWESFW.vbs every 2 minutes starting from the current time. The WCQCMXNSFCHWESFW.vbs script executed the batch file “C:\Users\Public\WJVIQQFZMZLSZTJJ.bat” (MD5: ec348cf15e839b8912862352bc916d22).

Content of YXRPNPSMGCOBEURV.ps1 Exploring AsyncRAT and Infostealer Plugin Delivery Through Phishing Emails
Figure 4: Content of YXRPNPSMGCOBEURV.ps1

The batch file WJVIQQFZMZLSZTJJ.bat is similar to CEIULUDEZFCEVSMM.bat, but it executes the NBUBMHCZJLEJXGVW.ps1 PowerShell script instead.

The first embedded binary “NewPE2.dll” (MD5: dcce5bc3e27295a1cbe13a411244fe93) in the script is the injector for the AsyncRAT payload. Specifically, it performs process hollowing on the RegAsm.exe process.

The strings referencing the APIs used for process injection are obfuscated by replacing specified placeholders with binary digits, reversing the order, filtering out non-binary characters, and then interpreting them as ASCII characters (Figure 5).

String obfuscation Exploring AsyncRAT and Infostealer Plugin Delivery Through Phishing Emails
Figure 5: String obfuscation

You can find the configuration for AsyncRAT here. This version of AsyncRAT also comes with the infostealer plugin. The RAT looks for the following browsers to exfiltrate the data from:

And the following cryptowallet browser extensions:

The following application extensions:

In conclusion, email continues to be a popular method for delivering malware, as shown in this case involving AsyncRAT infection, which not only facilitates remote access but also features information-stealing capabilities.

What did we do?

What can you learn from this TRU Positive?

Recommendations from the Threat Response Unit (TRU):

Indicators of Compromise

You can access the Indicators of Compromise here.

References

eSentire Unit
eSentire Threat Response Unit (TRU)

The eSentire Threat Response Unit (TRU) is an industry-leading threat research team committed to helping your organization become more resilient. TRU is an elite team of threat hunters and researchers that supports our 24/7 Security Operations Centers (SOCs), builds threat detection models across the eSentire XDR Cloud Platform, and works as an extension of your security team to continuously improve our Managed Detection and Response service. By providing complete visibility across your attack surface and performing global threat sweeps and proactive hypothesis-driven threat hunts augmented by original threat research, we are laser-focused on defending your organization against known and unknown threats.

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